evolved to help negotiating parties reach beneficial solutions and increase their social welfare. In many situations, the mediator does not have the authority to impose a solution on the parties or the power to compel them to uphold the agreement reached (unlike arbitration). Usually the mediator is neutral (unbiased) and objective.
Automated mediators, intelligent agents that serve as active mediators in the negotiation process, can help bridge the gap between people as they negotiate. They offer a discrete, impartial facilitator that might be more trusted than a human mediator. The computational resources of automated mediators might also be more useful in cases with incomplete information and uncertainty regarding the preferences of the parties, whereas the difficulty for a human mediator only increases. The use of automated mediators is far from widespread, however, perhaps because of their computerized nature and the inherent difficulties in bridging the gap between people.
This article introduces AniMed*, a domainindependent, automated, and animated mediator designed to improve the social welfare of people in bilateral negotiations. AniMed*, an English-speaking avatar, interacts with people negotiating face to face via a videoconference. AniMed*'s design lets it propose solutions that are in the context of the current negotiation state. (This strategy differentiates it from other automated mediators found in the literature; see the "Related Work in Automated Mediation" sidebar for more details.) AniMed* can also propose partial solutions, giving negotiators the option to incrementally strive for a beneficial solution. Moreover, the AniMed* strategy does not rely on the structure of the utility function of both negotiators; rather, it constructs a preference relation between the possible solutions. Thus, AniMed* has a generic strategy mechanism that lets it mediate proficiently with many types of negotiators without being restricted to a specific domain. In addition, AniMed*'s facilitation mechanism offers negotiators a negotiation N egotiations are procedures for resolving opposing preferences between two or more parties through discussion. The goal is to reach a mutually acceptable solution, without resorting to a struggle. Mediation, which involves a third party in the negotiation process, dates back to Ancient Greece 1 and has calculator, which displays each solution's utilities (or satisfaction score) at any given time. Lastly, because AniMed* was built on top of Genius, a generic negotiation framework, 2 it will be available to the public and can be modified and used in numerous domains.
To validate the benefits of AniMed*, we also designed two reducedfunctionality versions: AniMed does not include a facilitation mechanism, and AniMed -does not include an animated avatar (the mediator's proposals appear in plain text). We evaluated AniMed*, along with AniMed and AniMed -, in experiments with 130 people who negotiated face to face via videoconferences regarding a neighbor dispute. 3 The negotiations involved uncertainty with respect to the utility values of opposing parties. This uncertainty was also shared by the mediator, which only had information on the preference relation between the issues and values under negotiation. AniMed* significantly increased the individual utility score and the social welfare (measured by the sum of utilities) of both negotiators, compared to experiments in which AniMed, AutoMed 4 (see the sidebar), or no mediator were involved. The results also indicate that although people are content with the solutions they achieve without any mediator involved, they can achieve better solutions when AniMed* is present.
Negotiation Problem Description
We consider the problem of a proficient automated mediator to be a key to improving the performance of two human negotiators who strive to reach a solution on conflicting issues. The mediator is situated in finite horizon bilateral negotiations with incomplete information between two people. The negotiation consists of a finite set of multiattribute issues and time constraints.
Following the work of Michal Chalamish and Sarit Kraus, 4 let ℐ = {I 1 , I 2 , …, I m } be a finite set of issues over which the negotiators disagree. Each I j can be assigned a value from a finite domain of I j , E-Alliance is an automated mediator that offers support for multi-issue, multiparticipant, and multiple-cycle (cycles of proposals and counterproposals over the same set of attributes) negotiations. 3 These characteristics make the facility flexible enough for use in different domains. E-Alliance was developed for agent-agent interactions, however, and we focus on human-human interactions.
AutoMed most resembles our proposed mediator. 4 AutoMed monitors offer exchanges and actively suggests possible solutions. It uses a qualitative model for the negotiator's preferences, without past knowledge. The suggestions it makes are Pareto optimal according to its estimations. AutoMed was evaluated with human negotiators who negotiated using a computer system by exchanging offers selected from drop-down lists. AutoMed participates as a third party that sends suggestions via the system. However, AutoMed does not suggest incremental (partial) solutions, nor does it explain its suggestions. Moreover, AutoMed constrains the negotiators to work through the system, while a more natural approach would be to negotiate face to face. We eliminated these drawbacks in AniMed*, allowing it to generate more satisfactory solutions that are deemed more relevant by the negotiating parties.
Investigating the impact of avatars on user experiences, Nick Yee, Jeremy Bailenson, and Kathryn Rickertsen incorporated an animated avatar in their mediator. 5 They showed that using visualization leads to better interactions with people. Our experiments have indeed demonstrated different outcomes when an animated mediator was used compared to others.
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by k-that is, | | = k. The status quo is also a solution and thus it is a member of . A partial solution is an assignment of values to issues, where not all issues are assigned a value. The unassigned values are annotated with the empty value e.
The negotiation can end when
• the negotiators reach a full solution;
• one of the negotiators opts out, thus forcing the negotiation to terminate with an opt-out outcome; or • a predefi ned deadline is reached, whereby a status quo outcome is implemented.
Each negotiator can propose any number of possible solutions, which the other negotiator can either accept or reject. The negotiator can either propose a solution that consists of all the issues in the negotiation or a partial solution. Each negotiator is given the exact valuation of the values of dom(I j ) and thus can evaluate a solution's utility as the sum of these valuations. However, this private information is not shared between the negotiators. On the other hand, each negotiator shares with the mediator some information. For each issue in the set of issues, ℐ = {I 1 , I 2 , …, I m } and a set of values
, ,..., 
, assigns each value a rank between 0 and 1. Using these ranks, the mediator determines the scoring value of a solution, a = (v 1 , …, v m ) as
Now AniMed* can estimate whether one solution a 1 is at least as good as a 2 according to negotiator n,
, AniMed* will assume that a 1 is better than a 2 according to negotiator n, denoted a 1 ≻ n a 2 . We will also denote by order n (⋅) the ranking of each solution compared to all other solutions, based on this estimation. Thus, order n (a 1 ) is a number between 1 and k, where k implies the estimated best solution for negotiator n.
Neighbor-Dispute Domain
For our implementation and experiments, we chose the neighbor-dispute domain, 3 where a negotiation takes place between two tenants, Alex and Tyler. Both negotiators must negotiate to resolve the dispute or otherwise be forced to undergo a lengthy and costly dispute-resolution process. The issues under negotiation include throwing out the trash, using a shared basketball court, making noise, using the patio, and friends parking in the apartment's parking lot.
The scenario was symmetric for both negotiators in the sense that the negotiators could compromise and make trade-offs between the issues and the gains and losses were equivalent. On the parking lot issue, both negotiators received the same utility. On two other issues-the basketball court and the patio-the more one gained, the less the other gained. These two issues had the same scale in the utility scores. For the last two issues-trash and noise-the negotiators could use trade-offs between the values of both issues to gain the same utilities. (Detailed score functions for the domain are available at http://u. cs.biu.ac.il/~linraz/Papers/neighborsutilities.pdf.) The utility values ranged from 0 to 1,000 for both negotiators, where the Pareto-optimal solution generated a utility of 720 for both.
The negotiation was limited to 28 minutes. If the negotiators did not reach a solution by the end of the allocated time, the negotiation ended and both tenants would be required to undergo a costly dispute-resolution session. We modeled this outcome for both negotiators as the status quo outcome. Either negotiator could also opt out of the negotiation if they felt that the prospects of reaching a solution with the opponent were slim and that it was no longer possible to negotiate.
Mediator Design
The design of AniMed* is built on top of the Genius infrastructure, which is a rich environment that supports bilateral multi-issue and multiattribute negotiations, with both human counterparts and automated agents. Figure 1 gives an example snapshot of a negotiation interface. The focus of our research was to design an automated formulating mediator (as opposed to a manipulative one). That is, the agent tries to propose solutions and help the negotiators reach a mutually agreed outcome. AniMed* is not topic embedded, so it can be used in many scenarios, and it is aimed to animed* is not topic embedded, so it can be used in many scenarios.
be proficient in bilateral negotiations involving people.
AniMed* was implemented using two main considerations. First, it needed to generate solutions deemed relevant by the negotiating parties. To achieve this, AniMed* utilizes recent solutions proposed by the negotiators when generating its own solutions, thus centering its solutions on the current context of the negotiation. Second, AniMed* has a rich animated interface to make it appealing and user friendly (see Figure 2) . The animated design of AniMed* and the structure of the experiments were also motivated by earlier findings with respect to human-human versus humancomputer interaction. 5 Thus, when the negotiation begins, the automated mediator introduces itself in a way that will allow both sides to trust it.
Our motivation behind this strategy design was to generate solutions that would maximize the social welfare of both negotiators. However, this is difficult because the negotiators have conflicting interests and AniMed* is unaware of the exact utilities of the negotiators. To overcome this, AniMed* does not offer any solutions until after both negotiators have proposed or accepted a solution. It uses this information to try to find a set of solutions that can still increase both negotiators' utilities. One of its strengths is its ability to provide a solution on only a subset of the issues under negotiation, allowing the negotiators to incrementally improve the final solution. In addition, to prevent the negotiators from labeling its solutions as irrelevant, AniMed* does not propose any solutions that are identical to the last solutions proposed by the negotiators.
AniMed* follows a five-step strategy, which we describe here using an example negotiation. In this example, there are seven possible solutions. Negotiators A and B just proposed solutions labeled 3 and 5, respectively. Table 1 lists the information about the domain and the steps taken by AniMed* to decide on a solution to propose.
The first step in the algorithm is taken before the negotiation starts. AniMed* determines the scoring value of all solutions and orders them, as we described earlier. Then, during the game play, AniMed* chooses its suggestions based on these orderings and on the last solutions proposed by the negotiating parties (see the bold numbers in Table 1 ).
The next two steps are motivated by AutoMed's strategy. The second 
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step in AniMed*'s strategy is to discard all solutions that, for each party, have a lower ordering than that party's last proposal. Thus, AniMed* removes solutions with lower ordering for negotiator A (1, 2) and B (7), and it keeps the four other solutions. Then, in its third step, AniMed* searches for any non-Pareto-optimal solutions and removes them as well. In our example, solution 5 was nonPareto optimal.
In the fourth step, AniMed* orders all remaining solutions based on the following criteria. First, it orders them based on the solutions' joint ordering-that is, the sum of both orderings. If the solutions have the same joint ordering, it compares them to previous solutions proposed by each negotiator. However, to allow AniMed* to propose solutions that are in context with the solutions previously suggested by the negotiating parties, solutions that are more similar to previously suggested solutions and measured by the number of similar values between the solutions, are ordered higher. If there are still solutions with the same rank, AniMed* orders them based on the absolute difference in their ordering (see the last column in Table 1 ). Figure 3 presents pseudocode of the algorithm for generating a full proposed solution.
AniMed* now has a full solution that it can propose. However, from preliminary experiments, we observed that the dynamics of the negotiation mainly involve partial solutions. Thus, the fifth step in AniMed*'s strategy is to generate partial solutions that could still benefit the negotiators. AniMed* incorporates one of two mechanisms for generating partial solutions.
First, AniMed* generates a set of partial solutions based on joint-value issues-that is, issues with values that are estimated as generating higher utilities for both parties, based on their importance. For example, in the negotiation demonstrated in Figure 1 , several offers were exchanged by the parties until the parties agreed on four out of the five issues under negotiation (the trash, court, patio, and noise issues). The mediator then proposes a partial solution (call the police) for the parking issue, which is Pareto optimal for both.
Second, AniMed* applies a tradeoff scheme between the issues to choose the partial solution to be proposed. This is done by calculating the distances between the importance of given issues (see the "Difference importance" column in Table 2 ). For example, the result for the pair 〈basket-ball court, patio〉 is 3 -(-4) = 7. The higher the sum, the better candidate it is for selection in the partial solution in order to allow trade-offs. Figure 4 demonstrates the proposition of a trade-off based on these two issues. This example is based on a negotiation in which the parties exchanged several offers and did not come to an agreement. The mediator's offer also included a message stating that it believes that they can achieve higher scores if they are willing to compromise on these issues.
Another consideration implemented in AniMed* is a simple argumentation mechanism to try to convince the parties why they should consider the solution AniMed* proposes. When AniMed* 
1:
for all possible solutions a do 2:
Insert a to OrderedList A , OrderedList B 3:
Using proposes a solution it attaches a predefined text message stating that if the negotiators make the suggested trade-off based on the issues previously discussed, they can achieve higher scores (the text is slightly different if the suggested solution includes issues that were previously agreed upon by the parties or simply discussed). An additional approach incorporated in AniMed* relates to its presence during negotiations. To compel people to listen to the mediator's proposals, whenever it proposes a solution, it takes over the entire screen so people cannot conceal or ignore it. Moreover, the mediator was implemented as an Englishspeaking avatar (see Figures 2 and 4) , using a commercial text-to-speech engine in order to convey a less distant and computerized, more "humanized" appearance.
Experiments
In our experiment, we gave two negotiators the task of negotiating a beneficial solution. We conducted five experiments using the same domain to compare the proficiency of AniMed*. Each subject played in only one of the experiments to avoid biasing the results. One experiment involved matching people without any mediator. In another experiment, we matched two people with a simple automated mediator, AutoMed. 4 They demonstrated that this mediator enables the negotiators to achieve more satisfactory solutions in environments where only messages are exchanged.
Finally, we matched people in a setting that included our proposed mediator, AniMed*, as well as its reducedfunctionality versions, AniMed and AniMed -.
Experimental Methodology
The human negotiators accessed the negotiation interface via a URL. The negotiation itself was conducted as follows. Using a videoconference, the two players negotiated face to face about the different relevant issues. Because the research focused on the strategy of the automated mediator, natural language processing (NLP) was beyond its scope. Thus, we required that the negotiators submit their proposals using the negotiation system (this might also resemble real-life negotiations in which people talk and only occasionally propose official solutions). This let the automated mediator process the information. Nonetheless, the negotiation itself was not constrained in any way. The mediator sent proposed solutions to the parties via the animated avatar and the negotiation system. The acceptance or rejection of each solution was also done via the user interface.
We tested our agent using human subjects, all of whom were computer science undergraduates or graduate students. Our experiments involved 130 human subjects (65 pairs). We conducted a total of five subexperiments, 13 pairs in each subexperiment. The subjects did not know any details regarding the automated mediator with which they were matched.
The outcome of each negotiation was either they reached a full solution, they opted out, or the deadline was reached.
Prior to the experiments, the subjects were given oral instructions and were shown an instructional video about the experiment and the domain. Handouts with the negotiation protocol, specification, and their scoring function were handed to the subjects. The subjects were instructed to play based on their score functions and to achieve the best possible solution for them.
Experiment results
To verify AniMed*'s proficiency, we compared the final utility results in all experiments, as well as the number of proposals exchanged between the negotiators in each experiment. Lastly, we administrated questionnaires inquiring about the negotiators satisfaction with the outcome and their view on the helpfulness of the automated mediator. Table 3 summarizes the results of the individual utilities and the social welfare, measured by the sum of utilities of the negotiating parties. (In our results, they are denoted as Alex and Tyler.) First, we examined the final utility values of all the negotiations for each role and the social welfare, measured by the sums of the final utility values. We used Anova to test whether a significant difference exists when using the different types of automated mediator. Using Scheffe's test as post hoc testing of the Anova, we determined that using AniMed* or AniMed achieves significantly higher social welfare (1,388 and 1,404, respectively) than using AniMed -(1,283 with p < 0.009 and S o c i a l a n d E c o n o m i c c o m p u t i n g p < 0.02 as compared to AniMed* and AniMed, respectively), AutoMed (1,241 with p < 0.0075 and p < 0.004) or no mediator at all (1,240 with p < 0.0065 and p < 0.004). The utility of both sides was also statistically significantly different when AniMed* was involved compared to when AniMed -, AutoMed, or no mediator was involved.
Although AniMed* achieved better results than AniMed, the difference was not statistically significant. However, AniMed* achieved significantly better results than AniMed -in both roles, while AniMed did not.
Finally, we gathered the negotiators' satisfaction levels based on the final outcome they reached and their perception of how helpful the mediator was in reaching this outcome (see Table 3 ). The satisfaction levels ranged from 0 (lowest) to 4 (highest). The results show that the negotiators perceived AniMed* as more helpful than AutoMed (using the KruskalWallis test with p < 0.0001).
Surprisingly, the negotiators were content with the final outcome in every experiment, and although the satisfaction level was slightly higher when AniMed* was the mediator, the difference was not statistically significant. This is in contrast to the fact that the negotiators achieved higher utilities, both individually and combined, when AniMed* was involved, compared to the other experiments. These results support our belief in the need and benefits of using mediators in negotiation settings when people are involved. It is also interesting to note that when AniMed -was used, it received the lowest satisfaction and helpfulness ratings, compared to AniMed* and AniMed.
A niMed*'s main contributions compared to the other mediators are its animated, Englishspeaking avatar representation, its domain-independent strategy mechanism, proposing solutions that are in the context of the current negotiation state, and its ability to propose partial solutions. That AniMed* can be employed in any setting knowing only the structure of the preference relation between the issues reflects on its generality and its prospects of becoming widespread and useful in numerous settings.
Future research will involve validating the results in additional scenarios, including scenarios with nonlinear utility functions and numerous issues. We will also investigate other negotiation protocols in which the negotiation issues are not necessarily listed a priori but rather elicited during the negotiation itself. We will Table 3 . Average utility scores, social welfare, standard deviations, and satisfaction levels in the different experiments.
Deviation
Alex Tyler Social welfare Outcome satisfaction* Mediator's helpfulness* also extend AniMed* to present the negotiators with threats and the ability to enforce solutions and penalties. Future work will also extend the argumentation mechanism implemented by AniMed*.
